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Abstract 
The principle of res judicata is well-established in our law: 
essentially it means that parties to a dispute have only one 
metaphorical "bite at the cherry". The "bite" can entail appealing 
through the hierarchy of courts, but once the parties have 
exhausted their appeals, they cannot re-litigate the same 
dispute. However, in the recent case of Molaudzi v S 2015 2 
SACR 341 (CC) the appellant attempted to appeal to the 
Constitutional Court twice: the first time the application for leave 
to appeal was dismissed; the second time the application was 
granted and the appeal upheld. The appellant got a second "bite 
at the cherry". In Molaudzi v S the Constitutional Court developed 
the common law by creating an interest-of-justice exception to 
the principle of res judicata and – for the first time in the 
Constitutional Court's history – overturned one of its own 
judgements. In this case note I present the background of the 
case of Molaudzi v S, analyse the judgement, and differentiate it 
from another Constitutional Court case that dealt with res 
judicata, namely Mpofu v Minister for Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2013 2 SACR 407 (CC). 
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1 Introduction 
In the case of Molaudzi v S1 the Constitutional Court developed the common 
law by creating an exception to the principle of res judicata and – for the first 
time in its history – overturned one of its own judgements. This note is 
structured as follows: Part 2 introduces the principle of res judicata; Part 3 
presents the factual background of the case; Part 4 analyses the legal 
argument presented to the Constitutional Court; Part 5 analyses the 
Constitutional Court's judgement; Part 6 compares the case of Molaudzi v 
S with an analogous case where the Constitutional Court was also 
requested to overturn one of its previous judgements, but without success; 
and Part 7 concludes this note with a summary of the salient points.  
2 The principle of res judicata 
Res judicata is the legal doctrine that prohibits a litigant from having a 
metaphorical second bite at the cherry. It bars continued litigation of the 
same case, on the same issues, between the same parties.2 South African 
law inherited the principle of res judicata from Roman Law. In the case of 
Bertram v Wood,3 a case dating back to 1893, the Supreme Court of the 
Cape of Good Hope traced the principle of res judicata to Justinian's 
Digest.4 The underlying rationale of the principle of res judicata is (a) to give 
effect to the finality of judgements, (b) to limit needless litigation, and (c) to 
promote certainty.5  
Res judicata is usually raised as a defence in civil matters, but also applies 
to criminal matters.6 In the criminal law context, res judicata is related to the 
concepts of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. The latter two concepts 
can be seen as special cases of res judicata applicable as potential 
defences available to an accused person against prosecution. Res judicata 
in the criminal law context has wider application, and can also be raised by 
                                            
* Donrich W Jordaan. BLC LLB MPPS (University of Pretoria), PGDip (University of 
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1  Molaudzi v S 2015 2 SACR 341 (CC). 
2  Molaudzi v S 2015 2 SACR 341 (CC) [14]; also see: Baphalane Ba Ramokoka 
Community v Mphela Family; In re: Mphela Family v Haakdoornbult Boerdery CC 2011 
9 BCLR 891 (CC) [31]. 
3  Bertram v Wood 1893 10 SC 177. 
4  Bertram v Wood 1893 10 SC 177 180. 
5  Molaudzi v S 2015 2 SACR 341 (CC) [16]. 
6  Molaudzi v S 2015 2 SACR 341 (CC) fn 17. 
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the State, as was potentially the case in Molaudzi v S. 
3 Background 
In 2003, Thembekile Molaudzi, together with seven co-accused, stood trial 
in the then Bophuthatswana High Court on charges of murder, robbery, and 
some lesser offences. The outcome of this case hinged on the application 
of the Ndhlovu rule formulated by the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) a 
year before, in 2002.7 This rule entailed that an extra-curial admission, but 
not a confession, by one co-accused is admissible as evidence against 
another co-accused if required by the interests of justice. The interests of 
justice in turn required inter alia "strong corroboration in all the other 
evidence" of the incrimination of the co-accused.8 
However, in Mr Molaudzi's trial there was no independent corroborative 
evidence at all. The only evidence against Mr Molaudzi that was presented 
by the state was an incriminating "admission" statement made by one of the 
co-accused, Mr Matjeke (Accused 1), to a magistrate, and a statement by 
Mr Matjeke to a police officer during a pointing out excursion that was 
inconsistent with the statement to the magistrate. Following a trial-within-a-
trial, during which Mr Matjeke denied the veracity of his extra-curial 
statements, the trial court held that his extra-curial statements were indeed 
admissible as evidence against himself. On a proper application of the 
Ndhlovu rule, these extra-curial statements should not have been 
admissible as evidence against Mr Molaudzi, given the complete lack of 
corroborative evidence. Accordingly, as the state failed to present any 
admissible evidence against Mr Molaudzi, he should have been discharged 
at the end of the state's case.9 However, this is not what transpired.  
The trial court, purportedly (but erroneously) relying on the Ndhlovu rule, 
decided that the incriminating extra-curial statements made by Mr Matjeke 
were not only admissible against himself but also admissible as evidence 
against all his co-accused, inter alia Mr Molaudzi. As such, the trial 
proceeded. During his testimony Mr Matjeke again denied any involvement 
in the crime. However, later during the trial Mr Matjeke requested to re-open 
his defence and testify again, which request was granted. During his second 
testimony during the main trial, Mr Matjeke incriminated all his co-accused 
save himself and Mr Makhubela (Accused 3), but within a novel storyline 
that had marked discrepancies with his extra-curial statements. Mr 
                                            
7  S v Ndhlovu 2002 2 SACR 325 (SCA). 
8  S v Ndhlovu 2002 2 SACR 325 (SCA) [44]. 
9  S v Mathebula 1997 1 SACR 10 (W) 34J-35D. 
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Makhubela testified directly after Mr Matjeke's second testimony and 
essentially repeated Mr Matjeke's latest version of events. Mr Makhubela's 
testimony was wholly inconsistent with his extra-curial statement, which 
never even mentioned Mr Molaudzi.  
The trial court convicted Mr Molaudzi and all his co-accused (except a 
certain Mr Motloung, Accused 6, who disappeared during the trial) and 
sentenced them to life imprisonment. After eventually obtaining the 
transcripts of the proceedings, Mr Molaudzi and all his co-convicted 
appealed to the full bench of the Northwest High Court in 2012. However, in 
2013 the full bench confirmed the erroneous application of the Ndhlovu rule 
by the trial court and dismissed the appeal. Mr Molaudzi and four of his co-
convicted then petitioned the SCA, but their petition was dismissed without 
reasons. Finally, Mr Molaudzi on his own applied for leave to appeal to the 
Constitutional Court in 2013.10 I refer to this case as Molaudzi I. In his 
application Mr Molaudzi explicitly pointed out the erroneous application of 
the Ndhlovu rule by the trial court and the full bench. However, in 2014, 
given that his application had failed to raise a constitutional issue, the 
Constitutional Court dismissed his application with the following rationale:11 
The applicant now seeks leave to this Court essentially on the basis that he 
was wrongly convicted. The application cannot succeed. It is based on an 
attack on the factual findings made in the trial court. That does not raise a 
proper constitutional issue for this Court to entertain. In addition, there are no 
reasonable prospects of success. The Full Court considered the arguments 
on appeal and properly rejected them. The application for leave to appeal 
must thus be dismissed.  
With our country's apex court dismissing his application for leave to appeal, 
this must have appeared as the end of the road for Mr Molaudzi. However, 
about a month prior to the judgement in Molaudzi I there was a tectonic shift 
in Bloemfontein: the SCA reversed its decision in Ndhlovu in the judgement 
of Litako,12 re-establishing the common law rule that no extra-curial 
statement by a co-accused can ever be admissible evidence against 
another co-accused. The SCA based its decision in Litako on constitutional 
considerations. Subsequent to the Litako decision, two of Mr Molaudzi's co-
convicted, Boswell Mhlongo and Alfred Nkosi (Accused 2 and 4 in the trial, 
respectively), applied for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court. Unlike 
Mr Molaudzi's application, which focused on the erroneous application of 
the Ndhlovu rule, Mr Mhlongo and Mr Nkosi added an additional element in 
their applications to the Constitutional Court, namely that the Ndhlovu rule 
                                            
10  Molaudzi v S 2014 7 BCLR 785 (CC). 
11  Molaudzi v S 2014 7 BCLR 785 (CC) [2], footnote reference omitted.  
12  Litako v S 2014 3 All SA 138 (SCA). 
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on which the trial court and full bench purportedly relied was 
unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court decided to grant Mr Mhlongo and 
Mr Nkosi a hearing.  
During the hearing of Mhlongo v S; Nkosi v S,13 it became apparent that the 
Constitutional Court was ad idem with the SCA's Litako judgement. It should 
also be noted that, given the Litako judgement, the state did not oppose the 
applications. In fact, it was counsel on behalf of the state who, during the 
hearing of Mhlongo v S; Nkosi v S, brought it to the Constitutional Court's 
attention that "Accused 5" – Mr Molaudzi – was similarly situated to Mr 
Mhlongo and Mr Nkosi, in that all of these persons were convicted based 
on extra-curial statements by their co-accused. Accordingly, the 
Constitutional Court invited Mr Molaudzi to also apply for leave to appeal. 
At that stage, neither the Constitutional Court nor counsel for any of the 
parties realised that Mr Molaudzi had in fact previously applied to the 
Constitutional Court. Molaudzi I and the principle of res judicata would 
accordingly still pose an obstacle. 
Within days of the hearing of Mhlongo v S; Nkosi v S, the Constitutional 
Court granted leave to appeal to these applicants, vitiated their convictions 
and sentences, and ordered their immediate release. However, reasons for 
the judgement were reserved. 
4 Argument advanced on behalf of Mr Molaudzi 
Counsel for Mr Mhlongo and Mr Nkosi volunteered to represent Mr Molaudzi 
as well. However, once counsel started with his research, he soon 
discovered the existence of Molaudzi I. He addressed a memorandum to 
the Chief Justice informing the Chief Justice of Molaudzi I, but took the 
position that because the constitutional tenability of the Ndhlovu rule was 
neither raised nor decided in Molaudzi I, the issue of res judicata does not 
arise, and proceeded to file an application on Mr Molaudzi's behalf. I refer 
to this second application as Molaudzi II.14 The state did not oppose the 
application. However, the Chief Justice requested the parties to submit 
written argument on the issue of res judicata.  
                                            
13  Mhlongo v S; Nkosi v S 2015 2 SACR 323 (CC). 
14  Molaudzi v S 2015 2 SACR 341 (CC). It can be noted that the author was counsel for 
the applicant/appellant in Molaudzi II. 
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In his heads of argument, Mr Molaudzi's counsel relied primarily on the 
following dictum by the SCA in Smith v Porritt:15 
Following the decision in Boshoff v Union Government 1932 TPD 345 the 
ambit of the exceptio res judicata has over the years been extended by the 
relaxation in appropriate cases of the common-law requirements that the relief 
claimed and the cause of action be the same (eadem res and eadem petendi 
causa) in both the case in question and the earlier judgment. Where the 
circumstances justify the relaxation of these requirements those that remain 
are that the parties must be the same (idem actor) and that the same issue 
(eadem quastio) must arise. Broadly stated, the latter involves an enquiry 
whether an issue of fact or law was an essential element of the judgment on 
which reliance is placed. [Counsel's underlining.] 
Evidently, the legal issue of the constitutional tenability of the Ndhlovu rule 
was not an "essential element of the judgement" in Molaudzi I – on the 
contrary, it was not even raised or considered. Accordingly, Mr Molaudzi's 
counsel argued that his client's second application to the Constitutional 
Court was not susceptible to the exceptio res judicata. Counsel for the state 
was in general agreement with this argument. 
5 The Constitutional Court's judgement in Molaudzi II 
In a unanimous judgement penned by Theron AJ the Constitutional Court 
did not agree with counsel's argument, but reached the same outcome by 
developing the common law. The Constitutional Court held that although 
there is an analogy between causes of action in the civil context and 
grounds of appeal in a criminal context, the two contexts must to be treated 
differently. In contrast with Smith v Porrit, which dealt with civil cases, a 
criminal appeal must be considered res judicata once decided, irrespective 
of whether additional grounds of appeal may exist that can be raised in 
subsequent appeals. Essentially, an appellant in a criminal matter has only 
one bite at the appeal cherry, and must ensure that he or she raises all the 
relevant grounds of appeal during this single opportunity, because he or she 
will not be allowed a second bite at the cherry based on the existence of 
different grounds of appeal. As such, Mr Molaudzi's second application (at 
the invitation of the Constitutional Court) was held to be res judicata. The 
Constitutional Court's rationale was that the alternative, as proposed by 
counsel for both parties, would allow for consecutive appeals in criminal 
matters, each based on different grounds of appeal; and that such 
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consecutive appeals would "place too great a burden on the administration 
of justice".16 
It is important to note that the Constitutional Court differentiated criminal 
cases from civil cases; accordingly, the Smith v Porrit judgement remains 
valid in the civil context, meaning that there may be consecutive 
proceedings in the civil context, provided that the new proceeding is based 
on a point of law or a fact that was not an "essential element of the judgment" 
in a prior proceeding. This dichotomy raises the question: why would 
consecutive appeals in the criminal context be too burdensome for the 
administration of justice, while not consecutive civil appeals?  
After finding that Mr Molaudzi's second application was res judicata, how 
did the Constitutional Court find a way to assist Mr Molaudzi? In brief, by 
inventing the new way, given the unique circumstances of Molaudzi II: Mr 
Molaudzi was similarly situated to Mr Mhlongu and Mr Nkosi; while these 
two men had already been released from prison, Mr Molaudzi remained a 
convicted, incarcerated "murderer" – only because of a procedural rule. 
Accordingly, the Constitutional Court fashioned an interests-of-justice 
exception to the res judicata rule:17 
In this matter, the interests of justice require this Court to balance the rule of 
law and legal certainty in the finality of criminal convictions, as well as the 
effect on the administration of justice if parties are allowed to approach the 
Court on multiple occasions on the same matter, against the necessity to 
vindicate the constitutional rights of an unrepresented, vulnerable party in a 
case where similarly situated accused have been granted relief. As in this 
case, the circumstances must be wholly exceptional to justify a departure from 
the res judicata doctrine. The interests of justice are the general standard, but 
the vital question is whether there are truly exceptional circumstances. 
The Constitutional Court briefly analysed the relevant positions in the law of 
four comparative jurisdictions, namely Canada, the United Kingdom, India, 
and Singapore.18 With the exception of Singapore (in the criminal law 
context), all these jurisdictions recognise that res judicata is not absolute 
and allowed for exceptions in rare circumstances of "injustice".19 
In summary, the Constitutional Court held that Molaudzi II was res judicata, 
but that Molaudzi II presented truly exceptional circumstances that called 
for relief in the interests of justice. The Ndhlovu rule was declared 
unconstitutional in the judgement of the related case of Mhlongo v S; Nkosi 
                                            
16  Molaudzi v S 2015 2 SACR 341 (CC) [44]. 
17  Molaudzi v S 2015 2 SACR 341 (CC) [38]. 
18  Molaudzi v S 2015 2 SACR 341 (CC) [24]-[30]. 
19  Molaudzi v S 2015 2 SACR 341 (CC) [24]-[30]. 
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v S, and accordingly Mr Molaudzi was granted leave to appeal, his 
conviction and sentence were vitiated, and his immediate release from 
prison ordered.  
6 The interests of justice: a comparison between 
Molaudzi II and Mpofu 
Concepts such as "the interests of justice" and "truly exceptional 
circumstances" are of course susceptible to divergent interpretations. To 
illustrate: Molaudzi II was not the first time that the Constitutional Court was 
requested to reconsider one of its previous judgements. In Mpofu v Minister 
for Justice and Constitutional Development20 the applicant applied to the 
Constitutional Court for a third time for leave to appeal, the previous 
applications for leave to appeal having been dismissed. What potentially 
made the third application different from the previous unsuccessful 
applications was that the third application raised a constitutional issue for 
the first time – similar to Molaudzi II. However, unfortunately for the applicant 
in Mpofu, he failed to prove a critical factual averment on which the entire 
constitutional issue depended, with the result that the majority of the 
Constitutional Court held that no constitutional issue had been validly raised 
and dismissed the application. In the words of the majority, the applicant 
"failed to cross a preliminary hurdle".21 In contrast, the minority held that the 
court a quo had made a finding on the critical factual averment, hence 
establishing the necessary factual basis for the constitutional issue that the 
Constitutional Court could entertain. Given the minority's acceptance of the 
factual averment, it was necessary for the minority to confront the fact of the 
applicant's two previous unsuccessful applications for leave to appeal to the 
Constitutional Court in which he failed to raise the constitutional issue. In 
this regard, the minority held as follows:22  
But, under our Constitution, there may be scope for situations in which the res 
judicata principle is softened in relation to unrepresented accused persons. 
When unrepresented persons apply for leave to appeal, without necessarily 
properly knowing their rights and what arguments may be available to them, 
it could be unduly harsh to preclude them from subsequently applying for 
leave to appeal where they may have a valid point, particularly where there is 
a possible violation of one of their rights protected in the Bill of Rights. 
                                            
20  Mpofu v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development 2013 2 SACR 407 (CC). 
21  Mpofu v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development 2013 2 SACR 407 (CC) 
[58]. 
22  Mpofu v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development 2013 2 SACR 407 (CC) 
[15].  
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In contrast, the majority held as follows regarding the interests of justice in 
the Mpofu case:23 
Further, the interests of justice in granting Mr Mpofu's application are 
weakened by his failure to act timeously in bringing it. It has taken 10 years 
for this matter to be brought to this Court. The passage of this significant length 
of time has surely impacted on the possibility of establishing reliable evidence 
as to the facts on which Mr Mpofu's case rests. The interests of justice thus 
do not favour re-opening his case. 
Nor has Mr Mpofu adequately explained why he brought two previous 
applications to this Court for leave to appeal against his sentence in which this 
[constitutional] issue was not raised. 
Molaudzi II and Mpofu can be distinguished on at least two dimensions: in 
Molaudzi II there was no uncertainty about the facts on which the applicant 
based his constitutional challenge, while in Mpofu the application was 
crippled by factual uncertainty; in Molaudzi II the applicant was himself the 
victim of delays in the system, while in Mpofu the applicant dragged his 
heels in bringing the application.  
Regarding an adequate explanation for not raising the constitutional issue 
as a ground for appeal in his previous application, it can be argued that Mr 
Molaudzi could have raised the issue of the constitutional tenability of the 
Ndhlovu rule in Molaudzi I and indeed even before that in his petition to the 
SCA. In fact, prior to Mr Molaudzi's petition to the SCA the Ndhlovu rule had 
been subject to criticism in at least two SCA judgements,24 and the 
possibility of the unconstitutionality of the Ndhlovu rule had been raised in 
argument (but not decided) in the Constitutional Court.25 However, in this 
regard the Constitutional Court in Molaudzi II relied on the minority 
judgement in Mpofu quoted above, with the purport that absent proper legal 
representation, a lay person can simply not be expected to know and fully 
appreciate his or her rights and what grounds of appeal can be formulated 
based on such rights. 
7 Conclusion 
Molaudzi II established that res judicata is not an absolute prohibition in the 
context of criminal appeals. In truly exceptional cases where the interests of 
justice so demand, an appeal can be entertained despite the fact that the 
                                            
23  Mpofu v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development 2013 2 SACR 407 (CC) 
[69]-[70]. 
24  Balkwell v S 2007 3 All SA 465 (SCA) [32]-[35] (minority judgment); S v Libazi 2010 2 
SACR 233 (SCA) [14]. 
25  S v Molimi 2008 2 SACR 76 (CC). 
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appeal is res judicata. Given the facts of Molaudzi II, the interests of justice 
are more likely to favour the applicant in an application for leave to appeal 
in a case that is res judicata if persons similarly situated to the applicant 
have already successfully appealed to the relevant court. On the other hand, 
with reference to Mpofu, the interests of justice are less likely to favour the 
applicant if the new application raises a constitutional issue that is based on 
disputed facts, and the applicant has delayed for such a long time in bringing 
the application that the possibility of establishing reliable evidence as to the 
facts has been negatively impacted. 
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